INTRODUCTION
" Balka nization, " a term co ined for th e dissolu tion of t he Form er Yu go slavia, w as a me ssy and viol ent pro cess. Bo rd ers we re drawn accord ing to hi storical rights to terri tory , many times disregarding the eth ni cities th at in habited that land . Therefor e, man y pockets o f lan d wi th a high e th nic co n ce nt ratio n we re integrated into cou ntries w ith a di ffer ing ethni c maj o rity . E ven p rior to the d issol uti on of th e Fonn er Yu goslavia, boundari es within th e regi o n have always been a so u rc e o f viol ent co nt ent io n am on g the vario us eth ni cities living in th e region . Afte r th e Yu goslav wa rs o f th e 1990s, new border s were d raw n in th e Bal ka ns. O ne of th e m ost con te ntio us of th ese bor ders was th at of Koso vo as an autono mo us regi on within Se rbia. After NATO's illegal intervention in 1999 , Koso vo wa s established as a UN pr ot ect o rat e and left in sta tus limb o until it de clared in d epende nce in 2008 . Thi s has cau sed serio us co nflict bet w een not o n ly Se rb ia and Koso vo , hut w ith in th e ent ire inte rna tiona l conu uuniry.
The "West" w ant s th e m essy state of the Bal kan s to be cle aned up . The W est percei ves Koso vo 's ind e penden ce to be th e o n ly so lutio n . Ser b ia will neve r recogni ze th e inde pendence of K050 VO. Th e h isto ry of Koso vo and Se rbia began o ver 600 years ago; ho we ver, th e W est o nly sees M ilo se vic's atrociti es in th e 1980s-1 990s. What mu st he und er stood is th at both sides of thi s co nflict, th e Koso vars and th e Se rbs, both have blo od on th eir hands. T h e confl ict is not on e sided -both parties have been victims to horro rs fro m th e o the r; both sides share guilt. Thus, com p ro m ises and co n cessions must be made o n botl, side s.
It is o f vital importan ce for th e W est that th e Koso vo status qu estio n be resolved as qui ckl y, and cleanly as p ossibl e . H o w ever, the W est is pursuin g th e Ko sovo statu s qu estion with their own agenda , ignoring the concerns of th e Serbs. Thus [;lr, all ne got iations since Koso vos creation III 1999 hav e failed , large ly du e to the lack o f concessions from the W est.
This pa per propo ses th at in orde r to persuad e Ser bia to recogni ze Kosovo, new negotiati o ns must be mad e. The W est sho uld co nsider red rawi ng Kos o vo 's boundaries to kee p th e area no rt h o f th e river Iba r <I S Se rb ia, and also to co ntin ue offering EU M embersh ip to Serbi a. Th ro ugh th ese tw o co nc ession s per haps Se rbia co u ld he persu ad ed to recognize an
Serbia and Kosovo: A Resolution for Both Sides indep end ent Koso vo .
This p~per will first ex plo re the co m ple x hist ory o f Koso vo and Serbia from its ori gin s ill 13W) until the p resent day . Th en it w ill pr oce ed to in vestigat e th e co nce rns o f th e Se rbs in regards to th e valid ity and legality o f K o so vos indepe nde nce . T he qu estion abl e legality o f K oso vos declarati on o f Ind ep end en ce makes it ne cessary for other co nside rations to be m ade for Serb ia in hopes o f ato ning for potential vio latio n of Serbia 's so verei gnty. Lastly, it w ill pre sent alte rn ative solutio ns to reso lvi ng th e statu s q ue stio n , namel y th e partiti on o f Koso vo and M et ohija , and exp editing th e EU acc ession pr o cess for Serbi a.
HISTORY OF SERBIA AND Kosovo
T he m ost influential and defining m om ent o f Se rb ian hi story in Koso vo w as the Batt le of Koso vo o n June 28 , 1389 w he n th e Ottoman T ur ks in vad ed the province . Prince Lazar of Serb ia led O rt hod o x Christi an s to fight th e inv adin g Muslims. Althou gh it w as a milita ry defeat for the Ser bs, it w as a spi ritual and cult ur al victo ry: Lazar was a Se rb ian her o and di ed as a m art yr for th e O rt hodox [ lith. D efeat uni ted th e Se rbs religiously and politically, giVIng rise to Ser bian nation alism (D uijzings 20 00). T his territory is where Serbia's history , heritage, tradition and nation al id enti ty began and is still revered as th e birthplace o f th e Serbian T h e assassina tio n o f Ar chduke Franz Ferdin and of Au stria in Sarajevo b y tlie Serb ian gr o up tlie "Black Ha nd" in 1914 was th e-immediat e sp ark that starte d World War I. This political sho ot in g wa s an att em p t by the so u th-Slavic re-gion to gain inde-pe nd ence from th e Austri a-Hungarian Empi re to cr eate-a " G re-ate r Se rb ia." For th e durati on of W orld Wa r I, Au stria occ u pie-d Se rb ia, fig h ting seve ral d e vastating battl es. Au strian plant'S bombe-d civilian refu gees and so ldie rs indi scriminatel y-a quarter o f a million Serbs were killed, 15% of Serbi a's o verall populati on.
In th e interim be-t w een W orld W ar [ and Wo rld War 11 , Serbia and Ko so vo were integrated into th e Kingd om o f Yugoslavia, which en co m passed th e Western B alka n re-gio n . In 1941 , th e Axis Power s invad ed and o ccu pied th e Kingdom of Yu gosl avia, with Italy in stating a fascist, C roatian go ve rnm ent. The Albanian Koso vars also side d wi th th e Italians and Axi s Pow ers an d persecuted Serbs w ith in its boundaries. The Serbs side d w ith th e-Allied po we rs, and co nseq ue n tly 500,000 Serb ians w er e killed by the C ro ati an regim e. TheSerb ian O rt hod ox Church w as also deva stat ed; 217 Orthodox prie sts w ere killed.
Aft er Worl d W ar II, th e Kingdom o f Yu gosla via wa s liberated b y th e Alli ed P ower s ri nd becam e th e Fed eral R epubli c of Yu goslavia, ru led by th e iron fist of J osip B ro z Tiro . This new cou ntry was co m p osed o f what are now Slo veni a, C ro atia, Ma ced onia, Bo snia and Herzeg o vin a, Serbi a, and M ontene-gro. ln 1974. Tiro's Yu gosla via rati fied a n ew co nstitu tio n makin g it a fed eration o f six republ ics with Koso vo and Voj vo d ina ,IS auto no mo us regi on s w ithi n Serbia (Vidmar 2009). Ko so vo w as given an equa l v o t e in n ati onal go vernm ental bodi es; how ever, it w as not di stinguished as a " natio n " 111 the co nstitutio n (R o gel 2003). K oso vo and Vojv odiua w er e not" nations" as Serbi a, Croatia , Slo venia , M aced oni a, http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2009/iss1/3 M ontenegro and Bosni a we re. Rathe r, th e-region s w e-re co m p rised of "nati onalitie s" w ith in a "nati on " (Se rbia) . The term " natio n" app lied to th e " p eo ple-att ached to a ce rtain rep u blie," w hile " na tio na lit y" applied to th e " peo ple atta che d to on e o f th e two au to no mo us pro vin ces" (V idm ar 20 0li) . Th e 1974 co nstitu tion of Y ugo slavia m ad e it so tha t o nly n;ltions we re e ntitled to th e right of self-de te rm inario n and success io n (Vid m ar 2009). Koso vo rem ain ed a n au to no m o us regi on w ithi n th e " natio n" of Se rbia. T he Koso vars were un sntisfied with thi s poli tical arrangem ent a nd protested for recogni tion as ;) " natio n" and th us an in dep e nden t repu blic wi th in Y ugoslavia.
In 19S1i, Slobodan M ilose vic wa s elec te d president of Y ugoslavia . As p resid e nt, Milose-vic am end ed th e co nstitu tio n to esse ntially strip Albanians of th eir co nstitutio nal rights an d to take autonom y away fro m Kosovo and Vojvodina. These two reg ions becam e-subordinate to Serbian aut h o rities and no longer enjoyed their form e r auton o m y. T his also created strict segregati o n polici es imposed by the Serbs, increasin g th e te nsio n betwee n th e Kosovars and Se rbs (W hee le r 2000). In 19S9, the Democrati c Leagu e o f Koso vo (LD K) organized to peacefull y protest th e mi str eatment of Ko so vars 111 Serbia . Led by Ibr ahim Rugova, th e LDK worked th rou gh no n-vio lent m ean s to w ards all independ e nt Ko so vo . As Slo ven ia and Croa t ia sece de d fr o ru Y ugoslavia HI 1li91, th e LDK decla red ind ep end ence fo r Koso vo ;) S we ll (R oge l 20OJ) .
Aft er th e co llapse o f th e So vie t U nio n. Yu go slavia w as br ok e apa rt as " natio ns" sece de d from Y ugo slav ia to become se pa r.u e, indep endent states . In a n atte m pt to co nta in o rde r during thi s pro cess, th e Eu ro pean C o nu n u n iry M embe rs in l li9 I cre ated the Arb it ration Conu ni ssio n of th e In rernational C o nfere nce fo r P eace in Yu goslavia, also k now n as th e Badi nrer Com m issio n . This was to ad d ress the legal qu estions of th e d isso lu tion of Y ugo slavia. The Eu rop ean Con u n un iry estab lishe d set criteria to recogni ze the ind ep e nd ence of an y breaka wa y Yu goslav R epublics. T he Badinter Commi ssion was to e valuate eac h potential stat e on th ese c rite ria (V id m ar 20(9) . The Badinter Commission rul ed to uphold th e principle of uti possidetis juris: w h en a territory gains indep end en ce. ne w in te rna tio na l boundaries should onl y be dr aw n wh e re th ere previously existed inte rn al ad mini strative boundaries at th e tim e o f inde pe nden ce (Wa tso n 200S). Thus th e histori cal borde rs rema in the i nternationally recogni zed o nes .
Slo ven ia and Croatia both sece de d first; ho w e ver , th e p resident of Yugoslavia , M ilo sovic did not suppo rt th e di sso luti on o f Yu goslavia. M iloso vic attem pted to re u nit e the six " natio ns" in th e regi on . causing the o utb reak o f th e Yu goslav W ars in l lJ92. B osn ians, C roats, and Ser bs e ng .rgcd in et hnic cleansing and atrocit ies aga inst th e Muslim s in t he region fo r fo ur years. In fact, th e o ffic ial term "eth n ic clean sin g " o rigina ted in th e Bo sni an W ar. Although th ere we re EU and UN peacek eepers o n th e gro u nd in Bosn ia, N AT O a nd Inan y W estern co u ntries d id no t e ngage until l lilJ5 (R o be rt s 1( 99) . R ath er . th e in terna tio na l co m m u nity £liled to in ter ven e because th ey were hes ita nt to e nte r and vio late th e regi o n 's righ t to sove reig n ty in an in tri nsic civil w ar.
Foll owing NATO 's in ter ve nt ion against Bosni an-Serb forces in sp ring of 1995 , th e D ayton Peace Ac cord s e nd ed th e B osni an W ar. Yet, this peace treaty failed to pro vide protection for the Albanian min o rity in Se rbia. Rugova and the LDK w er e lar gely ign o red at the peace talks. The UN did w arn Belgrad e th at sanctio ns would continu e until Serbia started to "deal positively and directly w ith th e Koso vars" (Rogel 20 03) .
Being as non-viol ent, polit ical m ea ns failed to gam ind ep endence for Koso vo, in 19l)() th e Koso vo Liberation Ann )' (KLA) w as formed to ope n ly o ppose Se rbian rul e . T h is gro u p Serbia and Kosovo: A Resolution for Both Sides em p loy ed gu erilla tacti cs, w ith svs ter n atic bo m bing and terrori st actio ns agalllSt th e Y ugo-S I~I V l~lI l go ve n llne n t. Th e K LA assassinated Se rb offi cials throu gh out 1997 and J 998 (Ro gel 2003) . Th e Se rb gove rn m e nt c rac ked do wn o n th e Ko sovars in resp onse to th e militant !<.LA. T he UN co nde m ned the viole nce on both sides of th e co nflict , parti cul arl y th e "a ct s of terrori sm" co nd ucted h y the KLA . Vio le nce escalated as !<.LA offe nsi ves gr ew larger and bolder a nd in March o f 1998 , th e Se rbian Y ugosla v a rmy began retaliating nulita rilv aga inst the !<.LA .
In the fall o f 1998, th e Serbian go ve rn me nt , led by Pr esident Mil osevic, began a ne w ca mpaign o f e thnic clean sin g in Ko sovo (W heele r 20 00) . In w ha t becam e to he k no wn as the " O cto b e r Agreemen ts," th e U N Security Co u ncil tri ed to rec tify this pr obl em . H o w e ver, Ru ssia refu sed to inte rvene militarily to sto p th e ethnic clean sing in Ko so vo . D ur in g thi s time of disagreemen t a nd lack of act io n, M ilose vic escalated h is att acks aga inst th e K osov ars and KLA . Fin ally, after th e br eak do wn of d iplo mati c talk s, N ATO d ecided to tak e act ion on beh alf of th e Kosova rs and KiA . Air strik es agai nst Se rbia began on M arch 25, ] 999 and co ntin ue d fo r 1] weeks . H o w eve r, t his actio n was tak en w it ho u t expli ci t pe nui ssion from th e UN (Ro be rts, 19( 9). This bo m bi ng cam paign in Belgra de has been hi ghl y contes te d as illegitimate 'and aga inst internati on al law (Robe rts, 19(9) . N ATO fo rces kill ed m ore th an 5,000 Yugoslav so ldie rs and ove r 500 ci vili ans durin g th is bom bin g campaign (Sc hw abach 2003 ). A fte r th e su rr en de r o f M ilosevic, Ko so vo becam e a N ATO pr otectorate w ith UN assistan ce , but no clear roa dm ap wa s crea ted fo r th e future of Koso vo . The W est 's failure to int e rvene so o n e r in th e Bosni an War resulted in eth nic clea nsing of Muslims o n a 111d Ssive scale and destabili zation in Eu rop e . In 1999, th is f.1i lu re was very fresh . It is arg ue d that NATO gav e Kosov o p rotected auton omy as aton em ent to redee m its p rior m istake s and lack of ac tio n In th e Bal k an s (R ob erts, 1(99).
T he Ko so vo stat us p ro ce ss unde r th e j u risd ic tio n o f th e UN began in 2005 . In 200() intern ational n egotiati ons start ed to determi ne th e status of Ko sovo . Ma ny pa rties, parti cularly th e Serbs an d Ru ssian s, w e re co nce rne d with the rights and pr ot ection o f the l<l rge Se rbia n maj ority north of th e river Ib;IL During th e] 9')9 w ar, vio le nce was cond ucted o n bo th part ies ; th e Koso vars b y th e Ser bs an d th e Se rbs by th e Koso vars. Hundred s of Serbs III K oso vo were killed as th ey fled th e pro vin ce. Furth ermore, histori cal Se rbian O rtho d ox c h urc he s an d land ma rk s were destr o yed by Al ban ian Koso va rs (R o be rts J(99). Th e Serbs and Ru ssian s w ere afra id of ,I repeat of vio le nce against th e Se rbs in n orth ern Koso vo . Additionally , there w ere sev eral con cerns that inde pe nd ence for Kosovo w ould create ch aos an d igni te seve ral irre de ntist m o vem ents. Th e re are seve ral regi o ns w ith pocke ts o f a stro ng min o rity, e th ni c co n ce ntratio n wi t hi n th e Ba lkans: ma n y o f w hic h we re as dete rmin ed fo r ind ep e ndenc e as Koso vo . Many co un tries feared th at this w ou ld not o nly reignite these irredentist m o vem ents w ithi n th e Bal ka ns , bu t throu g hout th e wo rld. D u n ng th e ne goti ati ons, Se rbia wa s w illing to grant more auto no m y to Koso vo, but not ind ep enden ce .
This was fully sup p o rte d by Russia and C hi na. H o we ver, th e Koso vars deman d ed nothin g less th an inde pe nde n ce .
O n M arch 26, 2007 , UN spe cial e nvoy Martti A htisaa ri pr esented his " R e po rt o f the Sp ec ial Envoy of the Se cre tary Ge ne ral On Kosovo 's Future Status" to th e U N Se cretary Gen er al. In hi s p ro posal, Ahtisaari m ade th e re co m men datio n that Ko so vo should become independ ent , subject to a peri od of inte rna tio nal sup e rvisio n as gra d ua l ind ep en dence wa s gi ve n. Specifically, thi s pro posal prov ide d a set route for Koso vo to foUow for g radua l indepen d ence . Th e United States, alo ng with sev eral o the r co un tries in Western Europe , http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2009/iss1/3 is h ighl y su p portive o f th e " A htisaa ri Plan " for K oso vo ind ep enden ce . T h is plan o utlined pr o visions for th e new K osovo const itution, namely to ensure the rights of communities and the i r member and de cen tralizat ion o f local go vcn uu e ut . T he J ud icia l system wa s also ad d ressed , to e nsur e j ustice a nd the rul e o f law. The Se rb ian min ori ty was tak en int o gre at co nside ratio n . Spe cial p ro visions w ere m ad e in regard s to respecting th e Se rbs' reli gi ou s and cultural herita ge, imludin g se ve ral Serbian Orth od ox cath edrals and nat ional landmarks in Koso vo. Anothe r provi sio n was made to protect th e proper ty o f citize ns as K oso vo gained ind ep enden ce fro m Serbia (Balka n In vestigati ve R ep orting N et work 2007).
T he main prov isio n in thi s plan was to im plement th e Eu rop ean Se c urity and D efe nse Poli cy's Rule of Law mis sion in Koso vo (E U LE X) . T h is wa s to slo w ly r epl ace the UN Mission in K oso vo as the go ve rn ing intern at ional bo d y in Koso vo . Man y W estern cou ntries pledged to su p po rt th e A h risaari plan and saw ind ep enden ce for Koso vo as the o nly viable o ptio n to resol vin g this status probl em and bring stability to the region. 
Kosovo UNILATERALLY DECLARES INDEPENDENCE
Kosovo unilaterally d eclared its ind epend en ce from Se rbia on Feb ru ary 17 , 2008.
Wh ile the secessio n of a se mi -a uto no m o us re gi o n fro m a stat e is not in itself uniqu e , th e h isto ry behind K oso vo in dep enden ce is, as wa s ex plained in th e prev io us sec tio n. P rotests co nt in ue throu gh out both Se rb ia and K osovo as th e status q u estio n remains unresol ved . Th e co nd itio n o f human rights has d et eriorated as violence has spread throughout both K oso vo and Se rbia after K oso vos unilat e ral decl ar ati on of ind ep endence . T he re ha ve been se ve ral in stan ces where Alba nia n m in orities ha ve been per secuted and attac ked . 
Serbia and Kosovo: A Resolution for Both Sides

LEGALITY
Ser bia feels that its territorial integritv and so ve re ign ty we re violated wi th K osovos inde penden ce . Purrhermore, Se rb ia bel ie ves th at th e intern utional co m m unity lias n o t treated Ser bia as an eq ual in intemation al law.
In Se pte m ber o f 2008 , Se rb ia tabled a U N G ene ral Assembl y R esolution w ith th e in te nti on to c halle nge th e ma tter o f K oso vos in de pen de nce from po litica l to ICg:l1 gro unds (D T T N e ws, 9/ 2( 08). In October, th e UN Gen e ral Assem bl y did ad o pt R esoluti on 63 / 3, w hic h see ks th e Int eruati onal C o urt o f justi ce 's o pinio n o n w he the r o r no t Ko so vo"s u nilat eral declaration o f ind e pendence w as in ac cordance w it h internati onal law. T h e q ues tio n refe rr ed to the ICJ read s: " Is th e uni lateral declarati on o f in d epend en ce by the P ro visio nal Inst itution s o f Se lf-C ov e rrnue nt o f Ko so vo in acco rda nce w it h inte rna tio nal law ?" (Vid m ar 2( 09). Aft er a ten se votin g pe riod m the UN GA , Se rbia's resolution w as passed thou gh all EU co un tries abstaine d (VIP N e ws, 912008) . Thi s ICJ case w ill be difficult to decip he r. K osovo IS an unprecedented case within itself; howe ver, th e re are many clauses in inr er national c usto m ary la w th at ca n be ap plied to d et ennin ing th e legality o f Kosov os indep enden ce.
Ser bi a maintains th at thi s action w as a vio latio n o f th e UN C harte r be cause it did not respect the territorial integrity of Se rbia (V IP N e w s, 9/2008) . Th e Un ite d N ati ons was founded o n th e principle of so ve reignt y . C h apter I, Arti cle 2 (1) o f th e United Nations C ha rte r states th at , "The Organ izati on is based on the prin cipl e o f th e so vereign eq uality of all its M embers." Serb ia feel s that it is n ot be ing recognized as eq ual subj ect of inte rnation al la w w it h th e right o f te rritori al integrity . This co nce pt of so ve reig nt y is em p hasize d throu gh o ut th e c harte r alo ng wi th int ernati onal c usto m ary law. In parti cular, UN Sec uri ty C ouncil R esoluti on 1244 (whi ch is th e document th at end ed th e Kosov o war of 1999 and esta blished Ko so vo) spec ifically call s o n th e international co uu n u uiry to recogn ize Serb ia'.I te rr itorial in tegrity . In one of th e p erambu latory clau ses in the resolution it states, " Re affirming th e commitment of all Mem ber States to th e so ver eignty and territorial int egrity of th e Federal R epublic o f Yu go slavia and th e o th er State s of th e regio n , as se t o ut in th e H elsinki Final Act and annex 2. " It is clear th at th e international co mm u n ity had committed itself to resp ect th e territorial integrity o f Se rb ia; howe ver, it does n ot see m as th ough till s is th e case . The W est ge ne rally uph o lds th e values o f th e IC] and suppo rts its d ecisio ns . Howe ver, in thi s case , th e lC] w ill no t cha nge th eir o pi nio n and w ill co n tinue to support K o so vo 's indep end en ce. Ev en if th e ICJ do es de cid e that Kosov os declaration o f ind ep enden ce wa s not in acco rda nc e with internati o nal law , it is un likel y to undo w hat has b een d one . The sit uation cannot go bac k to th e fOIll1 er status quo. Kosov o w ill not go back to being a territo ry o f Serbi a. H o we ver, if th e ICJ rul es in favour o f Se rbia, deemin g K 0 50 VO' S d eclarati on of in d ependen ce illegal, it w ill di scredit Koso vo 's act ions. T he IC] o p inio n poses a p roblem to th e W est . This could sto p othe r co u ntries from rec o g nizi ng K osovo. Already, se veral countries have refu sed to give an o pinion o n th e m att er until afte r th e IC] o pin io n is rele ased. In fact , pr esiden t Boris T udic in vited those "U N m embers that ha ve not recognized th e provin ce's indep enden ce to rem ain so until th e Intern atio nal Co ur t o f justi ce offe rs Its o pinio n o n th e legality of thi s sec essio n " (Ser b ian G ov e rn me nt 2009). Althou gh Ser bia d oes not have mu ch popular su ppo rt d ue to W estern o pposi tio n, it does h ave th e law o n its sid e . It is cle ar that Kosovos decl arati on o f inde pe nd e nce is qu esti onable legall y. This puts th e W est in a pr ecarious sit uatio n-ho w to ato ne for their lack o f inte rve nt io n in the Bosnian C ivil War http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2009/iss1/3 acceptan ce by such prominent int ernati on al act ors makes it impossibl e tor Kosov o to return to the form erl y autonom ou s region w ithin Se rb ia. At th e sam e tim e , Serbia w ill ne ver let Koso vo becom e all indep end en t state . The status question mu st be resolv ed, and as soon as pos sible. H owev er, neither sid e is willin g to secede to the wi shes of the o th er. Currently , th e United Stat es and Europea n nations have pursued settling th e Kosov o status question in th e sallie m ann er th at it has been sin ce 1l)9l)-complete ind ep endence for Koso vo recogn ized by th e inte rn at io nal co m m u n iry. These co u ntries are pu shing Serbia to re co gni ze an indep endent Koso vo in disregard to the Serbi an interests. Th e internationa l co nu u un ity is left at a stalemate. This region is rife with histori cal conflict and hostilities th at have been foster ed for hundred s o f years. The Kosovo status issu e cannot he easily resolved , especially if neith er side offers co ncessio ns or co o perates in negotiations.
The use of politi cal pre ssure to force Serbia to reco gni ze Koso vo 's independen ce has pu shed Serbia furth er fronl the W est and towards it s sym path izing n eighbor Ru ssia (Eco nomi st 2008). This co uld have dire co nsequ ences for th e future of th e Balkan regi on. The rift betw een the East and West has already been gro w ing during th e past few years and has cause d rela tio ns bet w een the two to grow co ld o nce agai n. Russia wa rne d that thi s o bvio us br each in internati onal custom ary law co u ld de stabiliz e th e whol e European contin ent into an other o ut b reak o f Yu go slav w ars. Th e Ru ssian s' co n cerns are legitimate, and thu s it is em in ent that the W est chan ge its plan o f action.
Serbia needs to rec ognize Kosov o in order to establish <lny kind of peace or sec u rity in th e reg io n . Serbia' s rec og n itio n o f an indep end ent Ko sovo also legitimizes th e W est's acti on s and legitimizes Ko so vo itself Sim p ly forcin g Se rbia to recogni ze ;111 ind ep endent K oso vo is ob viou sly not workin g. R ath er, Serbia can he furth er en co ur aged to recognize K oso v o ifKosovo were to be partiti on ed and to co nt in ue Serbia 's integration into th e European Union within th e next few yea rs. These tw o m ajor concession s co uld h elp to create a pe aceful resolution to the Kosov o status question .
PARTITION OF Kosovo
Kosovo wa s created because th e regi on is populated by a differ ent eth n icity th reatened by th e ruling majority If this is a reason for granting independ en ce for Kosovo, th en the lin es o ugh t to be drawn in accordan ce to the erhui ciries. If bo rd er s are to be drawn for a ne w co u nt ry on th e basis of creariug nati on states, th en it seems prudent to keep th e nati ons with in th e same state border s.
C u rren tly, Koso vo enco lllp,lsses territory both north and so u th o f the riv er Ib ar . The north ern part of K osovo, Mctohij a, is predominantl y populated by Serbs not Alb anians. The 10% Serb populati on in all of Ko sovo reside s primaril y in Merohij a. One consid er ation during th e status negoti at ions w as to split Ko sovo and Metohija , keeping Merohija as part o f Serbia.
Serbia has show n deep con cern for the Serb min ority in M eroh ij a, as was see n in the depl o ym ent of th e Europ ean Union R.ule of Law Mi ssion III Ko so vo (EU LE X ). Se rbia has Serbia and Kosovo: A Resolution for Both Sides resiste d th e depl o ym ent of EULEX . in ord er to get so m e form o f ac ceptan ce, the United Nations and Eu ropean Uni on alt ered th e mi ssion ma nd at e in w hat is the " U N-Serbia Six -P oint Plan ." Serb ia w ill o n ly sup po rt ;1 mi ssio n to Ko so vo if it is 111 lint' wi th it s dem ands regarding th e deploym eut o f E U LE X, nam ely: EULEX ha ving a neut ral stan ce on Koso vos status , E U LEX mu st have no con nectio n w ith th e M arrti Ahti saari plan for K oso vo in d ependen ce and it o nly be deployed with the UN Se c ur ity C ouncil ap prov al. The UN-Serbia p lan calls for th e creatio n o f se parate Se rbian judici al custo m s a nd poli ce syste m s in th e n orthern, Se rbia n area of Kos ovo (D T T News, 11 /2008) . K osov o initially rejected th e UN-Serbia Six-Po int plan . w hic h had been ap proved by th e UN Sec uriry Cou nc il (D T T N ews, 12 / 20 08). K oso vo w ishes for unconditional and full deployment of EULEX ac ross th e entire te rrito ry, sup po rt in g th e M artti Ahtisaari plan . Th e y ,Irg ue that ne w 6-Po in t plan brea ch es K oso v os sove re ig n ty and territo rial integri ty and w ould lea d to w ards partition o f th e area (D T T N ews, 11 /20 08). Se rbia does not lo ok at th is as a pa rt itio n o f " Ko sovo " D ur ing n egotiati on s from 2005-20 07, it w as pr oposed th at th e Koso vo border be red raw n to e xcl ude M erohij a: a proposition that Se rb ia see m ed interested 111. Kosovo refus ed to entertain th e moti on o f partit ion o n th e gr ounds that it w o u ld violat e th e ir territorial integri ry. H o w e ver, if K oso vo is n ot full y re co gni zed as an indep end ent co u nt ry , then it d oes not seem to be in violation of territo rial integrity because both regi ons are in Se rbia. It would see m to be in th e be st inter est o f th e Se rbs in M er ohij a to re m ai n In Se rbia. Add ition ally, it would seem ill Kosovo' s best interest as w ell becau se thi s co nc essio n mi ght hel p its pursu it o f indep end en ce .
EU MEMBERSHIP
The co nflict ov er th e Ko sov o qu estion has strained Serhian-EU relati ons an d has pushed Ser bia furth er fro m th e West. This is not in th e int e rest o f th e EU . It is cr itical th at Se rbia a nd th e EU be united in policy in o rde r to bri ng stab ility to the Balkan re gi o n . Th e EU n eeds Se rbia no t o nly to sta bilize th e Ba lkans, but also to legitimize lllan y of th e EU member sta tes ' su p po rt o f Kosovo . Enlargemen t o f th e EU is one o f th e EU's m ost po werful policy tools, esp eciall y in e ns ur i ng sec urity , stab ility and co nflict pr evention (C o mmissio n o f Eu ropean Con u n u niries, 20 07) . The allu re o f Eu ropean Uni on m embershi p is a p o w e rful in centi ve and th e EU ca n use it to th e ir advanta ge to settle the Kosov o statu s qu estion.
The 1993 Eu ropean Co u nc il in Cope nhage n d ecid ed up on a co re se t of criteria for pote n tial ca nd idate co u ntries that th e co u nt ry must fulfill b efo re an y negotiati ons can start. T he "C o p e n hagen Cri te ria" sta tes that a cand idate co unt ry must have " stabl e in stituti ons th at g uar.m ree democr.rcy. th e rule o f law , human rights and respect for and protection o f min orities; a fu nctioning m arket eco no m y, as w e ll as th e abi lity to cope w it h th e pressure o f courpe tirio ns and m arket forces ar wo rk in side the Union ; th e ability to assum e the o bligations o f m emb e rship. in p arti cular ad he re n ce to th e obj ectives o f political , eco nomic an d m one ta ry uni on " (E uro pea n Cou ncil in C o pe n hage n 1( 93). T wo yea rs later at th e M adrid European C o unc il, these crite ria w e re clarifi ed : that not onJ y will the co un tries need to http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2009/iss1/3
show their willin gn ess to follow the criteria, out have th e capacity to put th e European Union rules and pr o cedures into effect (Europ ean Co u ncil in Madrid 199 5). N ot o n ly do es th e government need to m ak e legislati on to m eet th ese c ri te ria, but be able to impl emenr and en fo rce new legi slat ion th rou gh all e ffic ie n t ad mi n istra tio n a nd judi ciary , These a re th e cri teria th at Se rb ia, JS w ith all o the r appli caur s, must fulfill to ha ve o ffic ial candidacy status and even tually be com e a m em be r. Whil e it is important fo r Se rbia to also fulfill requirem ents defi ned in the Co pen hag e n and M adrid C riteri a, it is eve n m o re pressing that th e K oso vo statu s qu estion b e an sw e red . Exp editing the ac cession pro cess o f Se rbia w ill bring Ser bia close r to the EU faster. As sta ted earlier, accession is primaril y ;1 political act, wh eth er ex plic it or not. The EU sh ould use this political decision as le vera ge to further encourage Se rb ia to recognize Kosov os indep end ence. Serbia has clearl y ex presse d its wishes to b ecome an E U member. and th e E U shares thi s view. In September o f2008 . Ser bia's parliam ent ratifi ed it s Sta bilizatio n a nd Asso ciati on Agr eement w ith th e EU , th e first ste p to wards m embe rship. Since th en , Serbia ha s wo rke d o n building and streng the ning relati ons with th e E U and th e W est in ge ne ral. The governm ent has expressed its goa l for Se rbia to ha ve E U ca nd idacy in 2009 and accessio n by 20 15 (O TT New s, 200H) .
Serbia w ants to beco me an EU m ember: wi t h me mbers h ip com es Incr edible o ppo rtunity and prosp erity , parti cularl y economi cally. Co u ntries become Int egr at ed into th e common European m ark et th at ultimately strength en s th e co unt ries' economi es. Serb ia ha s ex p resse d its wish to ben efit from these opportuniti es th at th e EU presents. T he E U gives stru ctu ral funds to h elp de cr ease th e difference in livin g stand ards in its poorer regi ons and to b oost the economi es o f th ese regi0IlS as w ell (E uro pa 20(9) . Se rb ia ha s o ne o f th e w ea ke r econom ie s in Eu rope, and wo uld be n efit grea tly fro m E U integrati on (O T T N e ws 2(08) . Se rb ia has alread y show n its d et ermination to e n te r into th e European free mark et. E ven th ough the Dutch fro ze a ny furth er implem entati on o f th e SAA, Serbia ha s im pleme nted th e p ro visions o f th e Interim Ag ree me nt w it hou t th e help o f th e EU . This limited ac ce ss alo ne w ill improve th e Serbia n market subsran riallv an d help crea te m acroe conomi c stability wi th in the region (E uro pa 20 09) . Thi s has also allo w ed Ser b ia access into large r m ark et s, in cluding capital market s and has in creased trade, in vestment flows and foreign direct investm e nt. All of the potenti al o p po rt u ni ties for Serbia's econom y to grow hav e pr ovid ed sign ifi ca nt fiscal Incenti ve for Serbia's decision to app ly for can d idacy.
This is a pow erful in centi ve and the EU can use it to th ei r ad vantage to se tt le th e Ko so vo status qu estion . Enla rgem ent of th e EU is o ne of th e EU 's most powerfu l poli cy tools, espec ially in e nsu ring se cu rity, stability and co nflict pr e venti on (Co m m issio n o f Enro pe a n Com m unities, 2007).
Granting a co u ntry " cand idacy status" for th e EU h as alw ays been a political decision . This so ft po we r o f pote ntial EU membership h as e ncouraged several countries to improv e th e ir gove rn m ent's every sp he re o f influen ce and c ivil soc iety to confonn to EU poli cy . Alth ou gh Serbia has signed and ra tified its Stabilizat ion and Association Agreements, it had m ad e little progress towards m eeting the establish ed b en chmarks. Currently, Se rb ia is n ot read y for candidacy, ev en th ou gh the Serbian governm ent inte nds to submit a form al proposal for candidacy in April 2009 (Se rb ian Governm ent 200 9) . CONCLUSIONS 600 years of foul re latio ns bet w een th e Serbs and Koso vars h as made th e Koso vo status Serbia and Kosovo: A Resolution for Both Sides q ues tio n ex tre m e ly comple x and con tro versial. The recent interventi on s o f NATO and the U N pavIng th e road for Kosovos in d ep enden ce has augm ent ed thi s con te ntio us con flict to he o ne of th e mo st co ntroversial circ um stance s fK ing th e int ern ati onal co n un u niry. Ko sovo is w itho ut preced ence ill th e new int ernation al orde r go vemed by in te rnatio nal custom ary law and non-governm eur al organizati ons such as the UN and EU. Thus it is murk y w aters in w h ich~) JJ parties invol ved tread .
Int ern at ional custo mary law , uph eld by m ost ev ery state o n th e glo be, is built o n th e sta ndard of respect fo r ano t her state 's territo rial integrity and sove re ignty. Yet sim ultanco usly, th e right to self-d et erminati on is also a highly valu ed co ncept as well. In th e case of Koso vo and Serb ia, th ese tw o foundati onal concepts o f int ernation al custo m ary law are at en d s. Up ho ld Serb ia's so vereignty , o r su ppo rt Koso vos right to self-de te rn u na t io u?
In 1991J the W est co mm itted its sup port to self-determ inatio n and thu s Ko sovo. As th e West pursues its agenda, nam ely fo rcin g Ser bia to recogni ze Kos o vo , Serbia and Serbian sym pat hizers g row m o re isolat ed and di sgruntl ed by their actio ns. Q uite simply: it's not goi ng to work.
Concessions need to be made o n both sides. Th e West de m ands for Serbia to sacri fice Kosovo, ye t offers no sacrifi ce of th eir own . Kosovo means more to th e Serbs th an a piec e of land . Th is is th ei r nati on's birt hp lace-this is w here Se rbia be gan . Kosovo is th e heart of Ser bia. T o demand Ser bia to give th at up is in cr edibl y ditficult . Whil e nothing can ato ne fo r Se rbia' s loss III th e Se rbs' poi nt of view, the West needs to rect ify th is sit ua tio n as best as possible . Although it is too late to find a solutio n th at both parti es can agree to, some co ncessio ns can still be m ade . Partiti oning Ko so vo to ke ep Metohij a in Se rbia and brInging Serbia int o th e EU fold can en cou rage Serbi a to recognize Ko so vo and to start th e peace building p rocess bet w een the tw o co u nt ries.
